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IN TI-IE SUPRENiE cou·RT 
OF THE S'I'fa~rTE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
\ 
Plain ti ir ;· /J ' 
' Case No. 
HENRY RUGGERI, Judge, 
J
I 10631 
Def end an I. 
BRIEF OF PLAII\TTIFF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The State of Utah, acting through the District 
Attorney of the Third Judicial District, seeks an extra-
ordinary writ compelling the Honorable Henry Rug-
geri, District Judge, sitting by request in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, to withdraw his 
order of :May 20, 1966, ordering the suppression of 
testimony given by C. W. Brady, Jr., before a grand 
.iury in Salt Lake County and, therefore, making it 
unavailable for use in Criminal Case No. 19531 in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,\TER COURT 
On December 20, 1965, a grand jury sitting in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, returned an indictment 
against C. W. Brady, Jr., charging him with the crime 
of perjury in the first degree in violation of Section 
76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Subsequently, 
demands were made for bills of particulars, and various 
motions filed and determined. On March 24, 1966, 
C. W. Brady, Jr., filed a motion to suppress, along 
with a certificate of counsel. Brady sought to suppress 
the testimony he gave before the Salt Lake County 
grand jury on August 16, 1965. On May 20, 1966, the 
defendant, Judge Henry Ruggeri, granted the motion 
of Brady to suppress his testimony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks an extraordinary writ against 
defendant compelling the withdrawal of the order of 
suppression and allowing the evidence of Mr. C. W. 
Brady's testimony before the Salt Lake County Grand 
Jury on August 16, 1965, to be used in the prosecution 
of Criminal Case No. 19531 in Salt Lake County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff submits the following statement of 
facts: 
C. W. "Buck" Brady, Jr., was indicted for the 
crime of perjury in the first degree. The alleged per-
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Jurious testimony was given before a grand jury con-
rened in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1). 
Subsequent to the indictment, a motion to suppress the 
testimony given by Brady to the grand jury was made. 
The essence of the motion of Brady was that he had 
Leen a target of the grand jury's investigation an<l had 
not been allowed to have counsel in the grand jury room 
to advise him during the course of the interrogation 
(R. 24). Because of these failings, it was contended that 
the accused's rights to counsel under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of th~ 
United States and Article I, Section 12, of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah were violated ( R. 25, 
30), and also his right against self-incriminaion under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U nite<l 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the 
Utah State Constitution (R. 25). Attached to the 
motion was a certificate of counsel ( R. 27) , setting forth 
the occurrences in the grand jury room prior to the 
time Brady gave his testimony. A copy of the same 
certificate has been attached to the answer of the de-
fendant to the complaint for extraordinary relief in the 
instant proceeding. 
Brady appeared before the grand jury and in 
response to the first question, asked if he was "allowed 
to have counsel" (R. 27). The complaint in this case 
alleges that Brady had, in fact, consulted with counsel 
prior to appearing before the jury. Defendant's 
answer conyeniently denies the allegation because of 
lac>k of information, although counsel for defendant 
3 
herein is counsel for Brady and Brady is, in effect, 
privy to this action. However, the issue in this pro-
ceeding must remain in doubt, except to the extent that 
the record may validly lead to the inference that Brady 
was, in fact, well coached before he entered the grand 
jury room. After finally giving his name and address, 
Brady asked if he could have counsel and the district 
attorney inquired if he wanted counsel and Brady stated 
(R. 28): 
"I would like counsel. I wouldn't demand it. 
I just want it on the record that I did ask for it 
is all." (Emphasis added.) 
The district attorney then explained that Utah 
statutory law does not allow the presence of counsel. 
He then advised the witness that as to anything that 
might tend to incriminate him, no matter what the 
subject, the witness could invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Thereafter, the district attorney also 
informed the witness of the decision in Escobedo v. 
[Illinois], 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and asked if he were 
taking the position that he was not a volunteer wit-
ness. The witness then responded ( R. 29) : 
"I want to be a volunteer witness, but I did 
want to find out about counsel because I feel 
as though I should have counsel. I have been a 
law enforcement officer for so many years and 
always advised people of counsel. However, like 
I say, I am not going to sit here and demand 
counsel. Just want it as a matter of record that 
I asked for it because I come here as a willing 
witness." 
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The questioning then commenced and, thereafter, 
no claim of self-incrimination was invoked nor request 
to recess lo consult counsel was made, and the witness 
allege(lly perjured himself. 
The exhibit attaC'hed to the plaintiff's complaint 
shows one other feature of the testimony of the witness, 
that at the time he testified he was the Public Safety 
Commissioner of Utah, and the same allegation is made 
in the complaint, although the defendant candidly 
doesn't know the truth of the allegation.1 
Further, the record of proceedings at the time of the 
motion to suppress indicate certain relevant facts were 
also admitted. This record is before the court pursuant 
to preliminary order. Brady's testimony was given be-
fore the grand jury on August 16, 1965, but the indict-
ments against him on all charges were not returned until 
December, 1965 (R. 61). l\1r. l~rady had been charged 
in May of 1965 with the crimes of bribery and making 
profit off of public monies (R. 61, pltf's compl. 2, para . 
. 5). The charges were heard before the Honorable Mel-
,·in H. Morris, City Judge of Salt Lake City, and 
dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence (R. 61, 
pltf's compl. p. 2, para. 5). At the time of Mr. Brady's 
appearance before the grand jury on August 16, 1965, 
he appeared at the jury room voluntarily and was ap-
parently given a subpoena at that time (R. 69). 
Based on the above state of the record, the defend-
(])The maU.:;· relc.tes to tbc :<::cuo of a publi(' official and is 
approrrh:te for judicial nn~ice ~cc'ion ~2-23-1(5), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
5 
ant granted Brady's motion to suppress. The def enda11t 
in his order found that Brady was under compulsion 
of a subpoena, and the subject of inquiry before the 
grand jury was whether Brady had committed a crime 
and he was subsequently charged with a crime. 'fl1e 
court concluded that Brady was compelled in the 
absence of counsel to give evidence against himself 
(R. 54). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING THE MOTION OF C. W. BRADY TO SUP-
PRESS HIS TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY 
TO THE EXTENT HE FOUND A CONSTI'l'll· 
TIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF A WIT· 
NESS BEFORE A GRAND JURY. 
The plaintiff submits that there is no constitu· 
tional right to counsel before a grand jury, either under 
the Constitution of the United States or under the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The trial court apparently found a constitutional 
right to counsel before a grand jury. It has been the 
traditional rule in this country that counsel is not 
allowed to be present on behalf of a witness or a suspeet 
during a grand jury inquiry. Enker and Elsen, Counsel 
for the Suspect: Messiah v. United States and Esco-
6 
/11'do v. United States, 49 l\Iinn. L. Rev. 47, 73 ( 1965). 
In this regard, the provisions of Section 7'7-19-D, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, imn-:cles in its pertinent parts 
tliat the district attorney may appear before the grand 
jury, as may witnesses, the deputies of the district 
attorney, the attorney general and his assistants or 
rleputies in particular instances, and the special counsel 
for the grand jury when he is appointed. Further, the 
statute proYides that under certain circumstances, ste-
nographers, interpreters and the grand jury reporter 
may also be present. No other person may be present. 
and the statute expressly so states. 
In Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal 
Rules, sec. 6 :24 ( 1966) , it is noted: 
"A witness testifying before the grand jury 
is not entitled to the aid of counsel." 
In In Re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2nd Cir. 1931), 
fodge Learned Hand stated: 
"The appellant insists, that before a witness 
is compelled to testify before a grand jury, he 
should be appraised of the subject matter of the 
inquiry or the names of the persons against whom 
the inquiry is addressed, and that he should not 
be called upon to go unaided by counsel to an 
inquiry which is unlimited in scope and .f~r which 
he is entirely unprepared. But the privilege of 
a ,vitness aO'ainst self-incrimination is personal. 
Neither at ~ trial nor before a qrrmd ,jury is he 
entitled to have the aid of couuscl when testif;i/-
inq. It is hard to see why he must be warned of 
th'e nature or extent of his testimony which is 
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likely to be called for. A witness is not entitled 
to be furni_shed with facilities for invading issues 
or concealmg true facts. Every bonafide inves-
tigation by a grand jury seeks to ferret out crime 
and criminals. To detect crime and to present 
charges against the guilty requires the most 
ample power of investigation. Frequently, 
neither the nature of the crime itself nor the 
identity of criminals can be forecast. To be com-
pelled to state either in advance we think is likelv 
unnecessarily to impede investigation and ob-
struct the administration of justice." 
The court went on to note the rather substantial author· 
ity to the effect that a defendant need not be advised 
as to the nature of matter under investigation nor pro-
vided with counsel. 
The case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), 
is cited to support the proposition that an individual 
need not be informed of the nature of the matter under 
investigation. Numerous other lower federal court 
cases are cited in Orfield, supra, sec. 6 :22, in support 
of the same conclusion and the lack of right to counsel. 
Therefore, it is apparent that at the present time, there 
is no right to counsel before a grand jury. 
Further supporting the proposition that the tra· 
ditional rule does not allow counsel to be present at 
the time of interrogation of a witness by the grand 
jury is the United States Supreme Court's promulga-
tion of its own Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 6 ( d) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prior to 
July 1, 1966, provided: 
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"Attorneys for government, the witnesses un-
der examination, interpreters when needed, and 
for the purpose of taking evidence, a stenogra-
pher, may be present while the grand jury is in 
session, but no person other than the jurors may 
be present while the grand jury is deliberating 
or voting." 
Consequently, it appears that the United States Su-
preme Court has, itself, acknowledged the traditional 
constitutional and common law limitations upon per-
sons who may be present during grand jury investi-
gations. Certainly, if there were a constitutional require-
ment providing that counsel must be present if the 
witness so desires it, it would have been spelled out 
by the United States Supreme Court in Rule 6(d) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, 
it is important to note that although the United States 
Supreme Court most recently promulgated new rules 
of federal criminal procedure, American Bar Associa-
tion, Criminal Law Section Bulletin, March 21, 1966, 
p. 6, effective I July 1966, the only amendment to 
Rule 6 ( d) was a provision allowing the operator of a 
a recording device to be present, Second Preliminary 
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal 
Procedure for the United States District Courts, Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, March, 1964<. 
Certainly, the Supreme Court was aware of the 
counsel issue since it had most recently decided Escobedo 
1'. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 1964), and ltliranda v. Ari-
~rma, ____ U.S. ____ , 16 L. Ed. 694 (1966), was decided 
prior to the effective <late of the new rules. 
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In Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: 
Messiah v. United Stales and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 
Minn. L. Rev. 47, 74 (1965), it is stated: 
. "Permitting attorneys to be present in a grand 
Jury room during the taking of testimony might 
constitute a serious breach of grand jury secrecy 
which could hamper investigations and prosecu-
tions." 
The authors cite the provisions of Federal Rules 6 ( d) 
and 6 ( e) requiring secrecy. 
It should be remembered that there is a substantial 
difference between the nature of a grand jury investi-
gation and the nature of a police interrogation in a 
"back room." Escobedo and Miranda were directed 
against police interrogations, not the deliberative and 
investigative functions of a traditional legal body. The 
case of Escobedo v. Illinois was very unique. Danny 
Escobedo had been denied an opportunity to consult 
with counsel even though counsel appeared present at 
a Chicago police department and requested permission 
to speak to him and even though Escobedo himself re· 
quested permission to speak to his attorney. In Esco· 
bedo, the court said: 
"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the 
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into 
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a 
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken 
into police custody, the police carry out a P.r~c.ess 
of interrogations that lends itself to ehc1tmg 
incrimnating statements, the suspect has re· 
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quested and been denied an opportunitv to con-
sult with his lawyer, and the police have not 
effectively warned him of his absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent, the accused has been 
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 
'made obligatory upon the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment,' Gideon v. "\Vainwright, 372 
U.S., at 342, 9 L.ed.2d at 804, 93 A.L.ll.2d 733, 
and that no statement elicited by the police dur-
ing the interrogation may be used against him 
at a criminal trial." 
It should be noted that in the Escobedo case, the 
court spoke about "being taken into police custody." 
The court said that it is when the "police carry out a 
process of interrogation." Further, the court indicated 
that where the "police have not effectively warned him." 
Consequently, it is the police that the Escobedo case 
is directed at and not the judicial function of a grand 
jury. Under Escobedo, the interrogations must have 
reached the accusatory stage and not merely be investi-
gatory. In the instant case, there is no showing that 
the interrogation was in the accusatory stage. The grand 
jury was empaneled as a general investigatory body. 
There was no indication that Mr. Brady was before 
the grand jury because he was being accused of any 
particular crime. At best, the grand jury was acting 
as a body of general inquiry. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
there are substantial differences between interrogation 
m a stationhouse and that before a grand jury. In 
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In Re Graban, 352 U.S. 330, 337-348 (1957), the 
Supreme Court seemed to note the distinction and con-
sidered it more than an academic distinction but a 
rather substantial one. 
In Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th 
Cir. 1965), Chief Judge .Murrah stated that the decision 
in Escobedo applied to "any extra judicial examina-
tion," thus implying that it was not applicable to judicial 
proceedings and hence would not be applicable to grand 
jury proceedings. 
In the Graban case, supra, the court ruled that 
there was no constitutional right for an individual to 
have counsel before an administrative investigation 
by the State Fire Marshall. In a five to four majority, 
the court held that a fire marshall need not have pro-
vided counsel for the individual called to testify before 
him.Justice Reed, speaking for the court, observed that: 
"A witness before a grand jury cannot insist 
as a matter of constitutional right on being rep-
resented by counsel * * *. There is no more rea-
son to allow the present of counsel before a fire 
marshall trying in the puhlic interest to deter-
mine the cause of a fire * * * [In both situations, 
evidence obtained] may possibly lay a witness 
open to criminal charges, but until such charges 
are made in a criminal proceeding, the witness' 
protection is the privilege against self-incrimina-
nation." 
Thus, the Grogan case would clearly be precedent in 
this instance for denying any contention that the de-
12 
fendant in this case is entitled to counsel before the 
Salt Lake County Grand Jury or should have been 
adYised of a specific right to have counsel. 
Recently, in State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp. 
386, 206 A.2d 277, ( 1964), the issue was before the 
Connecticut court as to whether an accused man was 
entitled to have counsel with him before a grand jury. 
The court noted that proceedings before a grand jury 
were "not a critical stage in the prosecution that requires 
the presence of counsel," citing Connecticut cases ancl 
the decision of United States e;r rel. Cooper v. Reineke, 
333 F.2d 608, 611 (2nd Cir. 1963). 
In State v. Braash, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 
( 1951), this court stated, at page 460, loc. cit., regard-
ing the right to counsel at preliminary hearing: 
"But under the circumstances of this case, such 
failure did not constitute prejudicial error. The 
preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not a trial-
it is held in the place of a common law of grand 
jury where the accused is only present if called 
as a witness and is never represented by counsel." 
In Directory Services, Inc. v. United States, 353 
F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1965), the Eighth Circuit had occa-
sion to consider the question of the right to counsel 
before a grand jury. Although the court did not reach 
the merits of the appeal and dismissed the case on a pro-
L'edure point, the court observed: 
"If the merits of the appeal were reached, ap-
pellant would be no better off. The government 
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has also moved to dismiss upon the ground that 
the appeal is frivilous. Such contention must 
be sustained. Rule of Criminal Procedure 6D 
emphasizes the secrecy of the grand jury pro-
ceedings. In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 370, 77 S. 
Ct. 510, l L. Ed. 376, held that a witness had 
no right to be represented by counsel in an in-
vestigative procedure conducted by a state fire 
marshall under Ohio law. In support of its de 
cision, the majority opinion at page 333, 77 S. 
Ct. at page 513, states: 
'A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, 
as a matter of constitutional right on being 
represented by his counsel.' 
Supporting cases are cited in the footnote. Mr. 
Justice Black in a dissenting opinion at pages 
346-347, 77 S. Ct. 510, agrees that counsel for 
a witness cannot be allowed before a 'grand jury' 
but holds the fire marshall situation to be dis· 
tinguisha ble. 
For other cases discussing the historical back· 
ground of the grand jury procedure and holding 
that a witness is not entitled to representation 
by counsel before the grand jury, see Jones v. 
United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 342 
F.2d 863; United States v. Cleary, 2 Cir., 265 
F.2d 459; United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 255 
F.2d 113, 116." 
In People v. Iamiello, N.Y. S. Ct. (N.Y. Cty.). 
35 U.S. Law 'Veek 2003 (1966), a New York County 
court ruled that there was no right to counsel in the 
jury room but indicated that an opportunity to consult 
with counsel during a recess of the grand jury shoulrl 
be provided. 
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It is obvious, therefore, that the overwhelming 
weight of authority at the present time is to the effect 
that there is no right to counsel at the time of an 
appearance by an individual before a grand jury. 
Meshbesher, Right to Co1.1,nsel Before a Grand Jury, 
pages 28-29 ( 1966) ; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 
199 (10th Cir. 1942) . 
The attempt of defendant to invoke the decision 
of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, would not, in any way 
sustain a contention that counsel for a witness before 
a grand jury is a constitutional requirement. The 
Miranda case clearly dealt with police interrogation. 
Indeed, a substantial portion of the Miranda case dealt 
with consideration of police manuals and texts, chiefly, 
Inbau and Reed, Criminal and Interrogation Conf es-
sions ( 1962), and O'Hara, Funda?nentals of Criminal 
Investigation ( 1959) . The data used by the court 
clearly was concerned with basic conditions surrounding 
the interrogation by police. George, Constitutional 
Limits on Evidence in Criminal Cases, page 104 
( 1966) . See especially, the discussion concerning the 
efforts to trick and cajole a suspect by police, alluded 
to in Justice Warren's opinion in the Miranda case. 
The whole context of the case seems to be involved 
with police interrogation during the time the individual 
is in police custody. This is an entirely different circum-
stance than the situation where the witness appears 
in a grand jury proceeding where an officer of the court 
is present and where he is in relatively neutral circum-
stances before citizens of his own community. Conse-
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quently, there is no analogy between the apparent eyi\ 
the supreme court was attempting to control by the 
Miranda decision and the position of a witness appear-
ing before a grand jury. 
The decision of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201 ( 1964), is equally ioapplicable to the grand jury 
proceeding, unless there has been some form of accu-
satory process directed against the witness, such as the 
filing of a complaint, or an arraignment proceeding 
where counsel has already been appointed for him. In 
the Massiah case, the United States Supreme Court 
indicated that post arraignment interrogation was im-
proper in the absence of the presence of counsel. This 
case, therefore, is not legitimately in a posture to 
support the argument that counsel should be available 
to witnesses when called to testify before a grand jury, 
unless some prior arraignment proceeding was still 
pending against the witness. 
In addition, plaintiff submits that even if there 
were a constitutional right to counsel in the grand jury 
room, that the absence of counsel would not be a basis 
to suppress allegedly perjurious testimony. Especially ' 
should this be so where it is acknowledged by the wit-
ness, as in this case, that he was a voluntary witness 
and did not demand counsel, but merely wanted his 
request made of record. In addition, the witness being 
the chief law enforcement officer of the State and ac· 
knowledging his familiarit~r with constitutional rights. 
would hardly be in a position to claim that he shoulrl 
lh 
be excused from his perjury because of the absence of 
counsel. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in 
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 443 ( 1958), acknowl-
edged that where a 31-year-old graduate law student 
who was being held for the charge of murder had asked 
for the opportunity to obtain counsel and was denied 
that opportunity, the confession would still be deemed 
admissible, even though no advice was given to the 
defendant concerning his right to remain silent. Ad-
mittedly, the decision in the Crooker case is no longer 
applicable to the confession situation because of the 
rule of Miranda. It certainly is relevant in determining 
whether, in the context of the instant case, there was a 
need for the witness to have counsel before the grand 
jury and also whether, in the face of the absence of 
counsel, the allegedly perjurious testimony should be 
suppressed on any valid theory. 
The State acknowledges that this court in two cases, 
State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723 (1948), 
and State v. Hutchinson, 114 Utah 409, 200 P.2d 733 
( 1948), has indicated that where a witness is compelled 
to give testimony in disregard of his constitutional 
rights against self-incrimination, that evidence so given 
cannot be made the basis for a perjury charge. How-
ever, this is an entirely different situation than the case 
now before the court, since the witness here indicated 
that he was a "voluntary" witness and was not com-
pelled over a claim of self-incrimination to give testi-
1nony. 
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The same argument made by the witness Brad1, 
below was raised recently in the case of United Stat;,, 
v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1965). In that case, 
a witness before a federal grand jury was charged with 
perjury. His testimony before the grand jury was 
compelled by subpoena. The contention was made that 
the evidence obtained was in violation of the witness' 
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimi· 
nation. The court said, even so, that the absence of 
counsel would not preclude the charge of perjury on 
the false testimony. It is submitted that a distinction, 
and a very real one, can be drawn between the situation 
where a witness is compelled to take the stand and to 
give evidence against himself over his objection, as was 
the case in Byington and Hutchinson, and the situation 
in the instant case where Brady evidenced a willingness 
to testify and where the question of presence or absence 
of counsel would be most unlikely to affect the truth 
or falsity of what was said. 
All things being considered, it is submitted that 
the defendant erred in basing his order to suppress on 
the absence of counsel in the grand jury room. 
An author, commenting recently upon the obli· 
gation of an attorney to his client, when he is under 
federal investigation, stated: 
"A potential defendant or a witness before a 
grand jury has no righ~ to counsel (in the _roo~) · 
no right to confrontation. or cross-exammatJon, 
and no right to submit evidence that will rebut 
other evidence presented to the jury. He need 
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not even be told the subject-matter or names of 
persons under investigation." Dillon, When 
Your C,lient is Under F1 ederal I nvestigati<Yn, 
Part Six, 12 Practical Lawyer No. 3, p. 71, 
March, 1966. 
There is neither a state nor federal constitutional 
requirement that counsel be present with a witness in 
the grand jury room. ~""'urther, there is a general infer-
ence to be drawn from Brady's conduct in the grand 
jury room that he had, in fact, consulted counsel prior 
to his appearance and had been instructed to request 
counsel in order to attempt to extend the Escobedo 
rule, and the actual desire for counsel was more one 
of legal sham than actual need for protection. Also, 
his willingness to be a witness evidences no prejudice. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that this 
court should issue its extraordinary writ compelling 
withdrawal of the previous order of suppression exe-
cuted by the defendant. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING C. ,V. BRADY, JR.'S MOTION TO SUP-
PRESS ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE 'VAS 
A TARGET WITNESS AND THAT HIS 
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
WERE VIOLATED. 
\Vhen Brady appeared before the Salt Lake County 
Grand Jury, he was expressly advised by the district 
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attorney that he had a right not to give any testirnoni 
the answer to which might tend to incriminate him 0;1 
any subject . .Further, when he was told that counsel 
would not be permitted in the grand jury room, 1i~ 
expressly indicated that he was a volunteer witne:;s 
and would subject himself to questioning. Although 
Brady had apparently been served with a subpoena, 
he appeared at the time of his appearance. It is sub-
mitted that under these circumstances, there was no 
denial of the constitutional right against self-incrimi-
nation, either under the state or federal constitutions. 
The defendant apparently ruled that Brady was 
a target of investigation, and that, consequently, he 
could not be called before the grand jury and asked 
questions and that if he was so confronted, testimony 
given under such circumstances could not be used as 
the basis for a perjury complaint. This ruling requires 
an analysis of the nature of a grand jury in the State 
of Utah. There is no provision in the Utah Constitution 
granting to a defendant in a criminal case the absolute 
right to have his case presented to a grand jury. The 
principal means of commencing prosecution in the 
State of Utah is by a complaint followed by an infor· 
mation, at least in felony cases and cases of indictable 
misdemeanors. The Utah Constitution provides for the 
calling of a grand jury under present law only whcu 
the judges of the district determine that the com·ening 
of a grand jury is in the interest of justice. Article 1 
Section 13, Constitution of the State of Utah. CoHsc· 
quently, it is apparent that grand juries are not a' 1 
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integral part of the routine criminal prosecution of 
eases in the State of Utah. 
Historically, grand juries have been of two forms, 
accusatorial and inquisitorial. The early form of the 
grand jury at common law was more of an accusatorial 
body in that 12 of 23 grand jurors had to join in the 
accusation against a defendant, and at one time, the 
gra11d jury's accusation was the principal means of 
initiating criminal prosecutions. Moreland, Modern 
Criminal Procedure, page 193 ( 1959) ; 1 Stephen, 
History of the Criminal Law of England, 252 (1883). 
Subsequently, grand juries became less accusatorial 
and more inquisitorial, especially in the western part 
of the United States. Thus, Moreland, supra, notes at 
page 194: 
"Grand jury procedure, fundamentally, is an 
investigation, not a trial. The modern grand jury 
has two main functions. First, it inquires into 
crime in the community and, second, it has gen-
eral inquisitorial powers with respect to social 
conditions and public institutions and officers. 
"The attention of the grand jurors may be 
directed to possible criminal actions in the com-
munity by the court, by the prosecuting attor-
ney, by a volunteer from the community who 
comes before them of his own free will, or by a 
member of their own body who communicates 
such information to them." 
The Utah grand jury procedure is, in part, based 
upon the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal 
Procedure, secs. 132, 135, 136 ( 1931) , and is inquisi-
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torial in nature. Indeed, counsel for Brady at the time 
of the motion to suppress acknowledged that a grand 
jury is usually a "new experience" for each distriC'l 
attorney (R. 67). It, therefore, should be acknowledged 
that a crucial determination in analyzing cases applying 
the so-called "target" of investigation rule has often 
been whether the function of the grand jury is accusa-
torial or inquisitorial. In the decision of the defendant 
granting the motion to suppress, reference was made 
to cases from Eastern states and where the grand jury 
functions primarily as an accusatorial body. Addi-
tional analysis of this factor will be made in discussing 
the particular cases applying the so-called target of 
investigation rule. It is essential to determine whether 
there is any prohibition against calling as a witness 
an individual whose conduct may be suspect. 
In the instant case, Brady was called as a witness 
at a time when no charges were pending against him. 
He had been judicially exonerated from any criminal 
involvement with bribery or misuse of public funds. 
Judge Morris had dismissed the complaints filed against 
him and found any evidence of his participation in 
actions which would tend to show bribery or misuse ol' 
public funds insufficient to even demonstrate probable 
cause. It is, of course, natural that a grand jury 
sitting in Salt Lake County would, among many other 
matters of investigation, make inquiry into functiom 
of county government. Undoubtedly, there would be 
those who would object to Judge J\forris' determination 
and the grand jury would, of course, satisfy itself as 
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to whether there was any fire where there was smoke. 
This, however, does ~ot mean that Brady was a target, 
as meaningless as that term is, of the grand jury's 
actions. It merely means that the conduct of Brady 
would have been examined by the grand jury. How-
ever, there was no attempt to present the case before 
the grand jury to let the grand jury make an accusa-
tion as is of ten done where there is a constitutional 
requirement that an individual be given the opportunity 
to be indicted by a grand jury. Even so, the so-called 
target of investigation rule is a distinct minority po-
sition. 
In lVIeshbesher, Right to Counsel Before a Grand 
Jury, page 6 ( 1966), the author, arguing admittedly 
as an advocate for the right of counsel before a grand 
jury, acknowledges the so-called target rule as a minor-
ity position. He states: 
"There is, though, a line of enlightened state 
court cases which hold that if a possible defend-
ant testifies before a grand jury, his privilege 
against self-incrimination, even if not asserted, 
is violated and as a result is protected from in-
dictment based on any of his incriminating testi-
mony, as well as evidence obtained therefrom. 
This appears to be the rninority view and has 
not been followed in the federal courts." 
A witness before a grand jury, of course, may not 
mvoke the right to remain absolutely silent on matters 
that are not incriminatory. Cipes, Moore's Federal 
Practice, Vol. 8, 2nd Ed., p. 6.06 [2]. However, he 
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may, as Brady was advised in the instant case, invohr 
his privilege against self-incrimination at anytime aiid 
may not be punished for contempt of court, un]e;, 
after a judicial determination has been made by tht 
court and not by the grand jury, he continues to refuse 
to answer. Anno. 38 A.L.R.2d 248. Consequently, had 
Brady at anytime considered that any of the testimony 
he gave would have the slightest tendency to incriminait 
him, he was free to invoke his privilege which wou!tl 
most probably have been respected, but even if not, lit 
could have had the propriety of the invocation deter· 
mined by the court with the aid of counsel. 
In the trial court, at the time of argument ou !ht 
motion to suppress, Brady's counsel relied heavily upo11 
the decisions of State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388. 2011 
P.2d 723 (1948), and State v. Hutchingson, 114 Utah 
409, 200 P.2d 33 (1948), for the principle that eviderm 
obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimi· 
nation could not be the basis for a perjury prosecution. 
These cases clearly are not applicable to the instanl 
situation, since Brady was, first, thoroughly adYised 
of his right to ref use to answer incriminating questiom. 
and second, expressed a willingness to testify as a yo]· 
unteer witness and at no time invoked the privilegr 
against self-incrimination. In both the Byington allll 
the Hutchinson cases, there was a complete disregaril 
of the witness' right not to incriminate himself and h11 
testimony was, in fact, compelled over objectio11 
Further, no advice was given to the witness as to tJi, 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. 
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In People v. Nathanson, 134 Cal.App.2d 43, 28~ 
P.Zd 975, a defendant appeared before a grand jury 
under subpoena and was advised at the beginning of 
his testimony that he could refuse to answer incrimi-
nating questions. He, thereafter, indicated a willingness 
to testify and an indictment resulted. The California 
court ruled that the failure to assert the privilege, after 
the witness was advised of his constitutional rights, made 
the indictment invulnerable, irrespective of whether 
the witness was a suspect for a particular crime at the 
time he appeared before the grand jury. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
the case of United States Z'. Clcin, 247 F.2d 908 (2nd 
Circuit) , reached a similar result. See also United 
States v. Garnes, 258 F.2d 530 (2nd Circuit; United 
States v. A nnunziato, 293 F .2d 373 (2nd Circuit). 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. 
denied 361 U.S. 863, ruled that where a party was only 
a "potential" defendant when he testified before a 
grand jury, an indictment subsequently returned would 
not be invalidated where he was informed of his rights 
and testified without coercion. Accord, United States 
t'. Okin, 254 F. Supp. 553 (D.C. N.J.) 
Another case very directly in point on the instant 
issue is United States v. Hoffa, 156 F.Supp. 495 
ID.C.S.D.N.Y. 1957). In that case, a motion to sup-
press was made upon the basis that testimony obtained 
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at a grand jury hearing was obtained in violation 11 
the constitutional right to counsel. The court note
1
: 
that the contentions of Hoffa were that: 
"The perjury indictment is predicated uponj 
proceeding in which the defendant was called tn 
testify as a witness before the grand jury, i1 1 
violation of his common law and constitutional 
rights." 
The court noted that the "thrust" of the def endanL 
contention was that at the time the defendant was suli-
poenaed before the grand jury, the Government kne11 
that he was a prospective defendant and that counsel 
was not allowed to be present. The court noted that 
the preliminary inquiry concerning Mr. Hoffa's conduei 
indicated to Hoffa that he was a voluntary witness anJ 
that he was advised of his rights against self-incrimi· 
nation at the time he went into the grand jury room. 
In rejecting his contention, the court observed: 
"On the contrary, defendant went into thr 
grand jury room fully conscious of the natur'. 
of the inquiry, fully cognizant of what most ol 
the other witnesses had already told the grand 
jury, fully aware of the risk he was taking when 
he waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, full)' 
briefed in advance by counsel, and fully advised 
of counsel thereafter in the course of the grand 
jury session. He cannot now convert his gran1I 
jury appearance into an immunity bath." 
The case is similar to the instant one since whe1 1 
Mr. Brady went into the courtroom, he was advised 
of his constitutional rights, indicated that he was :i 
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',\illing witness, indicated that he did not demand the 
presence of counsel, and also indicated that he was 
familiar with the right to counsel and various other 
rights that a defendant in a case was allowed. Under 
these circumstances, there could be no basis for granting 
a motion to suppress. 
A landmark case is United States v. Scully, 225 
F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1955), where the defendant was 
convicted of conspiracy to defraud. The court rejected 
the very issue which the defendant predicated his deci-
sion on, and did so, stating: 
"These considerations do not apply to the in-
quisitorial proceedings of a grand jury. Such a 
body is not charged with the duty of deciding 
innocence or guilt and, for this reason, its pro-
ceedings have never been conducted with the 
assiduous regard for the preservation of proce-
dural safeguards which normally attends the 
ultimate trial of the issues. Thus, in such pro-
ceedings, there is no right to counsel, no right 
of confrontation, no right to cross-examination 
or to introduce evidence in rebuttal and ordi-
narily no requirement that the evidence intro-
duced be only such as would be admissible upon 
a trial. See United States v. Costello, 2 Cir., 
1955, 221 F.2d 668. 
If, as and when the question, whether the 
bundle of rights in the Fifth Amendment in-
cludes that of a defendant, already charged as by 
indictment, to a warning when subsequently 
called to testify before a grand jury, is squarely 
before us, it seems not unlikely that reasons other 
than the distinction between parties and mere 
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witnesses, above referred to, many convince u' 
that, under certain circumstances or absoluteh. 
a warning is required. '¥ e do not now say t1i;11 
it is not, but only that this court has not rukc 
on the point. 
It is at least clear that a prudent prosecutm 
to forestall the possibility of error, will in sud 
cases give a warning. Indeed, one would sur· 
pose that, as a matter of ethics or fair play or 
policy, a prosecutor would in all cases refraiL 
from calling as a witness before a grand jur: 
any person who is dejure or de factor an accused. 
The absence of appeals to this court involving 
the problem under discussion would seem to in· 
dicate that some such rule or practice is observea 
in the prosecutors' offices in this circuit. 
And so we now hold that the mere possibilit,~ 
that the witness may later be indicted furnislw 
no basis for requiring that he be advised of h/., 
rights under the Fifth Amendment, when sum 
maned to give testimony before a grand jul'}J 
We shall decide other cases as they arise." (Em 
phasis added.) 
In the instant case, there was no intention of the 
prosecutor "to seek the witness' indictment." Rather 
the matter was one of investigation and inquiry. Also e 
. . 
warnmg was given. 
The cases of Wilson v. United States, 163 U.S 
613, and Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, botJ, 
referred to in the Scully case, clearly support the facr 
that the motion to suppress should not have been grant 
ed in the instant case. 
In TVilson v. United States, supra, the defen<lnn 
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u, was in custody before a magistrate who questioned him 
). without warning of his rights nor allowing him counsel. 
:d The Supreme Court noted: ~u 
"And it is laid down that it is not essential 
11. to the admissibility of a confession that it should 
:I, appear that the person was warned that what 
u he said would be used against him, but on the 
ir contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is 
sufficient though it appear that he was not so 
warned." 
The court then went on to the facts of the case and 
noted: 
"It is true that, while he was not sworn, he 
made the statement before a commissioner who 
was investigating a charge against him, as he 
was informed; he was in custody but not in irons; 
there had been threats of mobbing him the night 
before the examination; he did not have the aid 
of counsel, and he was not warned that the state-
ment might be used against him or advised that 
he need not answer." 
In United States v. Lawn, ll5 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1953), the court noted: 
"A mere witness may properly be subpoenaed 
to appear and testify before the grand jury, 
though he may not be compelled to incriminate 
himself, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 
39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979, and he need not be 
warned of his privilege, but to avail himself of 
it, he must plead it whenever the answer to a 
question may incriminate him. United State~ v. 
Benjamin, 2 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 521; Umted 
States v. Miller, D.C., 80 F. Supp. 979." 
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In 38 A.L.R.2d 237, it is stated with reference 
to the privilege against self-incrimination: 
"It has been stated on appeal in several case~ 
that the privilege does not include the right to 
refuse to be sworn or testify at all but merely 
includes the right to refuse to answer a par-
ticular question under the proper circumstances." 
Although there are cases which indicate that if a 
witness is brought before a grand jury by a prosecutor 
for the purposes of seeking the indictment of the wit-
ness, his testimony cannot be used against him. A large 
number of the cases, indeed the overwhelming majority, 
have indicated that where the witness is advised of 
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and, 
thereafter, testifies, the evidence is admissible. 38 
A.L.R.2d, pages 276, 278. Further, courts have found 
that where the investigation was not pinpointed, as such, 
against the particular defendant, but he was merely 
a class of persons being investigaetd, this will not excuse 
perjurious testimony before a grand jury. 38 A.L.R. 
2d 285. 
Counsel for Brady relied, at the time of argument, 
on the cases of People v. Tomacello, 264 N.Y.S.2d 
686 ( 1965), and People v. Yonkers Contracting Com-
pany, 263 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1965), and other New York 
cases, applying the so-called "target" of investigation i 
rule. However, these cases and cases from other juris-
dictions having comparable constitutional provisions 
to New York are not applicable. 
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In United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2nd 
Cir. 1965), the defendant was convicted of perjury 
before a federal grand jury. His testimony before the 
grand jury was compelled under subpoena. The con-
tention was made that it was in violation of his consti-
tutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. 
In response to the self-incrimination argument, the 
court stated : 
"Short shrift may be made of appellant's claim 
that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the Government from ever 
summoning before a grand jury one who has 
become a target of inquiry and is a 'potential' 
defendant. TVhatcvcr IMJ,IJ uc the rule in the 
State of New Y orlt', the F'ifth A mendrnent docs 
riot proscribe the practice here invei,qhed a,qainst. 
Repeatedly, this court has so ruled, declining 
to equate the position of a 'potential' defendant 
called before a grand jury with that of one al-
ready on trial." 
The court notes that the New York decisions are totally 
inapplicable under the Federal Constitution. Further, 
the court cites several decisions from federal courts 
rlirectly to the contrary where the claim has been raised 
based on the Federal Constitution. See United State.~ 
P. Pappadio, 346 F.2d .5 (2nd Cir. 1965), where the 
court again refused to say that there was any consti-
tutional basis for the "target" rule; and United States 
r'. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 
H60 U.S. 936. To the same effect is United States v. 
Srnlfy, 22.5 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 
e.s. 897. 
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In the \Vinter case, the court went on to say: 
"To suggest that once an individual is nameJ , '[ 
by witnesses before a grand jury under circun1 I 
stances which may lead to his indictment, he 1 
thereby automatically gains immunity from sub-
poena would denude that ancient body of a suu-
stantial right of inquiry. This grand jury was 
engaged in a broad investigation of alleged 
bribery and corruption of FHA officials. It 
had the right, and indeed the duty, to follow leads 
wherever they pointed, to determine whether 
bribery and other illegal practices had been en-
gaged in and, if so, what builders and official . 
were involved and how far up the official ladder I 
the alleged wrongdoing extended. It had a legiti- 1· i1 
mate interest in summoning 'Vinter before it." I s. 
Thus, the Winter case rejects the New York rule as ' 11 
having any application under the Federal Constitution I a 
and does so with a rather substantial analysis of the 
federal and state law. It is submitted, therefore, that I 
there is no constituional basis to contend that the target 
rule as the defendant states it is somehow applicable 
to his case and warrants the suppression of his testi· 1 
mony before the grand jury. Further, it is submitted I t 
that the defendant has failed to bring himself factually I t 
within the target rule situation. a 
I 
The present Constitution of the ~tate of_ ~ew I e 
York expressly grants an accused the right to md1ct· ( 
ment by a grand jury. Indeed, the requirement of pre· I 1 
sentment of a case to the grand jury is mandatory in I I 
the absence of a waiver. 26 Albany Law Review, page 
1; sec. 253.2, Code of Criminal Procedure of New . 
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i 
York; Article I, Section 6, Constitution of New York. 
The latter provision provides: 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal or otherwise infamous crime, unless on indict-
ment before a grand jury." 
Thus, the function of a grand jury in the State of New 
York is entirely different than the general investigatory 
grand juries traditional in Utah. New York State 
Constitutional Convention ( 1938), 3 Revised Record 
2570. 
I It is submitted, therefore, that the defendant erred 
I
. in granting the motion to suppress and that this court 
should issue its extraordinary writ compelling the 
, withdrawal of the order and allowing the prosecution 
I against Brady to proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the defendant, if allowed to stand, 
would effectively emasculate the grand jury system in 
[ the State of Utah. Investigations into public corrup-
1 
lion and misdoing would, so long as our prosecuting 
attorneys remain 8ubject to political pressures and 
election be substantially diluted and wholly ineffective. 
1 Obviously, the imposition of the rule that the defendant 
I imposed in this case, being in excess of that compelled 
by the federal constitution, being unrelated to the con-
text of the Utah Constitution, and being contrary to 
>tatute, was erroneous and should not be left standing. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
JAYE. BANKS 
District Attorney 
Third Judicial District 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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